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A B S T R A C T 
This study aims to verify the correlation between financial distress and earnings management of tax 
aggressiveness moderated by corporate governance. This study uses a population of manufacturing 
companies that publish their financial statement on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 until 
2018. Sample collection was performed using a purposive sampling method, resulting in a total of 212 
populations that published complete financial reports. This study was tested by using the Multiple 
Regression Analysis test. This research gave empirical proofs that financial distress and real earnings 
management positively influenced the tax aggressiveness was supported, the proportion of independent 
commissioners weakened the financial distress and negatively impacted the tax aggressiveness was 
supported, the total audit committees weakened the financial distress and negatively influenced the tax 
aggressiveness was not supported, the proportion of independent commissioners and total audit 
committees weakened the real earnings management and negatively affected the tax aggressiveness 
was not supported 
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Financial distress is an early symptom of bankruptcy due to a decline in financial conditions experienced by a company (Sulastri and 
Yane, 2018). When a company experiences financial distress, management will try to maintain its business sustainability by 
increasing profits, assuming that investors will remain interested so the company's operational activities can continue. For this reason, 
the company will try to manipulate the income so that the tax paid is smaller, if this is done continuously, the company will be 
considered as tax aggressiveness. The effect of financial distress on tax aggressiveness is still a matter of debate among researchers. 
Putri and Anis (2017) found that financial distress have a positive effect on tax avoidance. If the risk of bankruptcy is high enough, 
the company will aggressively practice tax avoidance and ignore the risk of audits conducted by the tax authorities. 
Apart from financial difficulties, earnings management is also a measure that can be used to manipulate corporate taxes. Earnings 
management is a choice of accounting policies or concrete actions taken by managers to achieve company goals (Scott, 2015: 445). 
Researchers took the other way by measuring earnings management using accrual earnings management. Based on the research of 
Geraldina (2013), Silvia (2017), Nugroho and Amrie (2017), and Surahman and Amrie (2017), managers prefer to use real earnings 
management rather than accrual earnings management. Real earnings management is a priority by management because real earnings 
management is less attractive to auditors and regulators than accrual earnings management, and besides, accrual earnings 
management is riskier (Nugroho and Amrie, 2017). Researchers also found inconsistencies in the results of previous studies. Based 
on research by Karinda (2018), Nugroho and Amrie (2017), Lolana and Susi (2019), Arief, et al. (2016), Geraldina (2013), there was 
a positive relationship between earnings management and tax aggressiveness. Companies are more likely to use accounting choices 
that reduce reported income (income decreasing) to reduce taxable income so that companies can make savings on tax burdens (Putra 
and Elly, 2018). The more aggressive earnings management performed by a company means a high level of corporate tax 
aggressiveness because the tax burden is getting smaller. Meanwhile, based on the research of Henny (2019), Ginting and Elly (2018), 
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earnings management did not affect tax avoidance. Earnings management, statistically, does not have a significant effect on tax 
avoidance, where the greater income decreasing performed by the company does not indicate tax avoidance. In line with the positive 
accounting theory put forward by Watts and Zimmerman (1990) which states that positive accounting theory explains and predicts 
accounting practices based on the assumption that managers, shareholders, and regulators (politics) seek to maximize utility which 
is directly related to with their compensation and prosperity. Companies or management tend to report profits carefully to avoid 
stricter scrutiny so governments will try to exploit tax errors to reduce taxes based on their future sustainability. 
Tax avoidance that is carried out by companies is an act of irregularities that can be prevented by monitoring and good corporate 
governance based on regulations, laws, and business ethics (Karinda, 2018). This study included corporate governance as the 
moderating variable, which could weaken the influence of financial distress and earnings management on tax aggressiveness. 
Corporate governance in this study used a proxy for independent commissioners and audit committees. Independent commissioner 
is one of the needed corporate governance mechanisms to reduce agency problems between owners and managers (Hanifah and 
Agus, 2013). The greater the proportion of independent commissioners in a company equals to a greater company's supervision, so 
management will be careful in making decisions and be more transparent in running the company to minimize tax aggressiveness 
(Rosidy and Rahadi, 2019). The audit committees is a corporate governance mechanism which is assumed to reduce the agency 
problems by which if the agency problems are ignored, it will cause financial distress for the company (Hanifah and Agus, 2013). 
Companies with audit committee will inhibit earnings management behaviour and are expected to observe practices that are contrary 
to the principle of information disclosure (Murhadi, 2009). 
Literature Review 
Theoretical Background  
Agency theory explains the contractual relationship that occurs between the company owner (principal) and the company manager 
(agent). When the principal and agent wish to maximize their respective interests (there is no alignment yet), then there is a possibility 
that the agent acts not in the interests of the principal. The principal tries to maximize profits (risk takers), while the agent as an 
activity operator tends to dislike risk that is too large (risk adverse). To reduce conflict, the principal needs to monitor the agent's 
performance. 
Positive accounting theory is the selection of accountant policies made by companies that aim to maximize company profits. Positive 
accounting theory assumes that managers will rationally choose good accounting policies according to them. Company managers 
who are actively exploring will choose to change the reported profit from the current period in order to increase the present value of 
the bonus flow, so that even though high profits will not have an impact on high taxes. 
Trade-off theory is a capital structure model based on the trade-off between debt advantages and disadvantages. This theory assumes 
that the company's capital structure is balanced between the benefits of using debt with the cost of financial distress and agency cost. 
The debt incurs an interest expense that can save taxes. Interest expense can be deducted from income so that the profit before tax 
becomes smaller, and thus, the tax is also smaller. The use of increased debt will lead to financial distress or bankruptcy. Bankruptcy-
related problems will most likely arise when the company includes more debt in its capital structure. A bankrupt company will have 
very high accounting and legal burdens and also have difficulty retaining its customers, suppliers, and employees (Wikartika and 
Zumrotul, 2018). Trade-off theory explains the relationship between sacrifices and benefits from debt usage (Mutamimah and Rita, 
2009). 
Empirical Studies and Hypothesis Development 
Financial distress and Tax Aggressiveness 
Financial distress is a decline in a company's financial condition before bankruptcy. Financial distress causes operational activities 
to not running smoothly. To run its business a company needs working capital to finance its activities), management will try to find 
a way to run the operational by acquiring debt. Debt is one of external funding to finance the company's activities. A reason to choose 
debt as the funding source is the tax benefit. Financing through debt incurs interest expense, thus reduce the taxable income, however  
higher debt increases the company's burden. 
The effect of financial distress on tax aggressiveness is still debated among researchers. Putri and Anis (2017) found that financial 
distress has a positive impact on tax avoidance. If the risk of bankruptcy is high enough, the company will aggressively practice tax 
avoidance and ignore the risk of an audit by the tax authorities. Saputra et al. (2017) found that financial distress affect tax avoidance. 
Financial pressure intensification in a company will lead to an increase in corporate tax avoidance. Richardson et al. (2015) studied 
the impact of financial distress on corporate tax avoidance, including the global financial crisis in Australia. They concluded that 
financial distress had a positive relationship with tax avoidance and that the relationship between financial distress and tax avoidance 
had increased due to the global financial crisis. Warsini et al. (2018) found that financial distress had a positive effect on tax 
aggressiveness. Based on the explanation above, the researchers predicted a positive influence between companies with financial 
distress and tax aggressiveness. Thus, the first hypothesis of this study is: 
H1: Financial distress positively influence the tax aggressiveness 
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Earnings Management and Tax Aggressiveness  
Earnings management by the management improves the possibility of a company to take tax aggressiveness action. Graham et al. 
(2005) concluded that the managers tended to conduct real earnings management instead of accrual earnings management. Real 
earnings management is a priority by management because real earnings management is less attractive to auditors and regulators than 
accrual earnings management, as stated by the research of Ratmono (2010) that proved that the manipulation of real activities from 
companies in Indonesia did not gain attention from auditors. Accrual earnings management carries the risks because earnings 
management by relying on discretionary accruals can only be done at the end of the year, so the manager's ability to manipulate 
earnings is limited, and as a result, the profit target cannot be achieved (Ningsih, 2015).  Managers could reduce the risks by 
manipulating real activities during the current year (Ningsih, 2015). 
There are several studies on earnings management and tax aggressiveness, such as  Geraldina (2013), Nugroho and Amrie (2017) 
who found that real earnings management through operational discretionary cash flow and production costs increased the likelihood 
of companies engaging in tax aggressiveness. Arief et al. (2016), Putra and Elly (2018), Novitasari (2017) found that earnings 
management affected tax aggressiveness. In contrast, the research of Ginting and Elly (2018), and Henny (2019) found that earnings 
management did not affect tax aggressiveness. Based on theoretical considerations and previous researches, the researcher predicted 
a positive influence between companies that carry out earnings management and tax aggressiveness. Based on this explanation, a 
hypothesis can be proposed: 
H2: real earnings management positively influences the tax aggressiveness actions 
The Moderation Role of Corporate Governance on the Financial Distress Influence on Tax Aggressiveness 
Companies that experience financial distress tend to perform tax avoidance to reduce cash outflows and company expenses (Rani, 
2017). Richardson et al. (2015), Putri and Anis (2017), Meilia and Adnan (2017), and Saputra et al. (2017) successfully proved the 
positive influence between financial distress and tax avoidance, which means, companies with high financial distress would perform 
aggressively on the taxes to keep the excellent image of said companies. To lessen the tax aggressiveness, corporate governance must 
be conducted. 
This study used the numbers of the independent board of commissioners and the audit committee as the proxies for corporate 
governance. The existence of independent commissioners could prevent information asymmetry between agent and principal, which 
could cause financial distress for the company (Hanifah and Agus, 2013). The larger proportion of independent commissioners in a 
company means greater company's supervision, so management will be careful in making decisions and be more transparent in 
running the company to minimize tax aggressiveness (Rosidy and Rahadi, 2019). The audit committee is a corporate governance 
mechanism which is assumed to be able to reduce agency problems, which, if the agency problems are allowed, it will cause financial 
distress for the company (Hanifah and Agus, 2013). The right number of audit committee members can make them use their 
experience and expertise to protect the interests of shareholders, thus reducing the possibility of the company experiencing financial 
distress (Radifan and Etna, 2015). The existence of an audit committee in the company can minimize tax avoidance practices (Diantari 
and Ulupui, 2016). Based on the research of Rani (2017), Octaviani and Sofie (2018), Putri and Anis (2017), larger number of 
independent commissioners in a company can prevent managers from taking tax aggressiveness. Based on the research of Rani 
(2017), Novitasari (2017), Putri and Anis (2017), with intensive supervision from the audit committee, the information provided by 
the company will be more accurate and have quality so that the possibility of companies making arrangements for their tax burden 
tends to be small. This shows that the independent commissioners and audit committees negatively affect the tax aggressiveness. 
Based on theoretical considerations and previous researches, the following hypotheses could be proposed: 
H3: corporate governance (independent commissioners proportion) weakens the influence of financial distress on tax aggressiveness  
H4: corporate governance (total audit committees) weakens the influence of financial distress on tax aggressiveness  
Role of Corporate Governance Moderation of the Influence of Real Earnings Management on Tax Aggressiveness  
Earnings management is the effort from managers to deliberately manipulate financial reports within limits permitted by accounting 
principles to give suitable information for financial report users. The more aggressive the companies in their earnings management 
means higher tax aggressiveness due to the smaller tax burden. The research by Geraldina (2013), Nugroho and Amrie (2017) found 
that that real earnings management through operational discretionary cash flow and production costs increase the likelihood of 
companies engaging in tax aggressiveness. Meanwhile, based on the research of Ginting and Elly (2018) and Henny (2019) stated 
that earnings management does not affect tax avoidance. Solving this agency problem requires corporate governance. To achieve 
good corporate governance, companies must create corporate governance mechanisms that be achieved through independent 
commissioners and audit committees. 
Based on research by Suyanto and Supramono (2012), Independent Commissioners variable had a negative effect on tax 
aggressiveness. On the contrary, the study of Tiaras and Henryanto (2015) showed that Independent Commissioners variable did not 
affect tax aggressiveness. Another factor that is predicted to influence corporate tax aggressiveness is the supervision of the Audit 
Committee. Companies that have audit committees will inhibit earnings management behaviour and are expected to see practices 
that are contrary to the principle of information disclosure (Murhadi, 2009). Ariyani (2014) tested that the frequency of audit 
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committees meetings did not affect tax aggressiveness. In contrast to the research that was conducted by Seprini (2016), which found 
that the intensity of the audit committees meeting affected the company's tax aggressive actions. 
Based on the research of Hapsoro and Adrianus (2016), Wardani and Wening (2017), Kusumawati (2015), Rani (2017), Octaviani 
and Sofie (2018), and Putri and Anis (2017), greater numbers of independent commissioners in a company could prevent managers 
to perform tax aggressiveness. Based on the research of Kusumawati (2015), Rani (2017), Novitasari (2017), Putri and Anis (2017), 
intensive control from audit committees create more accurate and quality information and the smaller possibility of said company to 
adjust their tax burden. Based on the above explanation, the next hypothesis can be stated as below: 
H5: corporate governance (independent commissioners proportion) weakens the influence of real earnings management on tax 
aggressiveness  













Figure 1: Research Model 
Research and Methodology 
This study examined the effect of financial distress and earnings management on tax aggressiveness with corporate governance as 
the moderating variable. This research used quantitative analysis. The population in this study were all manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period of 2017 to 2018. The sample in this study was the purposive sampling 
technique based on judgment. The criteria for the companies that were sampled in this study are as follows: 
i. The manufacturing companies that were listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange that provided complete data in 
their Financial Reports from 2017 to 2018. 
ii. The companies recorded positive value on their profit before tax. 
There were 288 companies in this research as the population with 212 sample companies. 
Operational Definition and Variable Measurement 
The variables in this study included two independent variables: financial distress and earnings management. This study also had a 
dependent variable, namely tax aggressiveness, and a moderating variable, namely corporate governance, which in this study was 
represented by the proportion of independent commissioners and the number of audit committees. 
Dependent Variable  
Tax Aggressiveness 
The dependent variable in this research was tax aggressiveness. Tax aggressiveness is an action to reduce taxable income, legally or 
illegally, to reduce the tax burden. The effective tax rate (ETR) proxy is used to measure companies which performed tax 
aggressiveness. 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑡





Real Earning Management 
Combinantion 
Tax Aggressiveness 





Financial distress is a stage of decrease in a company's financial condition before bankruptcy or liquidation. This research used the 
Altman Z-Score model. Higher Z-Score shows a healthier financial situation. Z-Score has a negative correlation to tax aggressiveness. 
To adjust the measurement with variables, the produced Z-Score is multiplied by -1; thus, higher values reflect the financial condition 











𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑





Real Earnings Management 
Real earnings management is an opportunistic action by management to manipulate profit numbers in financial reports through 
company real operational that could directly affect the cash flow. Roychowdhury (2016) stated three real earnings management 
calculation as below: 
a. Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (Abnormal CFO) 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1










Abnormal CFO is the actual CFO reduced by normal CFO that is resulted from the calculation. The abnormal CFO interpretation is 
lower abnormal operating cash flow means higher real earnings management actions from managers. 
 

























Rowchowdhury (2006) formulated Prodi,t = COGSi,t + ΔINVi,t. Using two equations above. Calculating the coefficient of normal 
production cost estimation uses the regression equation below:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1














Calculating the abnormal production cost (APROD) is by reducing the actual production cost with normal production cost estimation. 
The interpretation from abnormal production cost is higher abnormal production cost means higher real earnings management. 
 











The interpretation from the abnormal discretionary expense is lower abnormal discretionary expense means higher real earnings 
management behaviour. 
 
d. Real Earnings Management Combination 
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As an overall measure of real earnings management, abnormal operating cash flows (Abnormal CFO), abnormal production costs 
(Abnormal PROD), abnormal discretionary costs (Abnormal DISC) are summed. Following Cohen et al. (2008) real earnings 
management is calculated as follows. Abnormal CFO and Abnormal DISC are multiplied by -1 to equalize the direction of real 
earnings management. 
REM = (Abnormal CFO*-1) + Abnormal PROD + (Abnormal DISC*-1) 
Moderation Variables 
Corporate governance is one of the concepts in increasing economic efficiency between company management, the board of directors, 
shareholders, and stakeholders. Corporate governance is measured using two proxies: the independent commissioners and the audit 
committees. 
Independent Commissioners 
Independent commissioners are members of the board of commissioners from outside the issuer or public company that are not 
affiliated with the board of directors, other members of the board of commissioners and controlling shareholders. They are free from 
business or other relationships that may affect their ability to act independently or act solely for the sake of interests of the company. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦
All members of the Board of Commissioners in the Company
𝑥100% 
Audit Committees 
The intensive supervision from audit committee gives more accurate and quality information and lessens the possibility for the 
company to control its tax burden. Audit committee acts to offer a viewpoint on problems related to financial, accounting, and internal 
control policies. The audit committee consists of what companies listed on the stock exchange, at minimum three people from inside 
the company or from the independent commissioner. The audit committee is responsible to the board of commissioners. The variable 
measurement is the total number of the audit committee, considering that audit committees, independent and internal, is not separated 
from its origin. 
Data Analysis Model  
This model used the Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA); thus, three regression models in this research are below: 
Model 1: 
AP =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑀 +  𝜀𝑡 
Model 2: 
AP = α0 + β1FD + β2REM + β3KI + β4KI*FD + β5KI*REM + εt 
Model 3: 
AP = α0 + β1FD + β2REM + β3KA + β4KA*FD + β5KA*REM + εt 
Note: AP = Tax Aggressiveness, FD = Financial Distress, REM = Real Earnings Management Combination,  KI = Independent 
Commissioners,  KA = Total Audit Committees.  
Research Results and Discussion 
Table 1 shows the results of the descriptive statistics analysis. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimal Maksimum Rata-rata Std. Dev. 
      
AP 213 0,001 0,971 0,27240 0,154 
FD 213 -14,770 -0,348 -3,12881 2,024 
REM 213 -37,207 0,772 -2,88504 3,152 
KI 213 -1,000 0,000 -0,38522 0,146 
KA 213 -5,000 -2,000 -3,05400 0,253 
 
Based on the above table, the ETR value ranges around 0.001 to 0.971 with an average of 0.272 and standard deviation of 0.154. The 
financial distress value ranges from -14.770 to -0.348 with an average of 3.129 and standard deviation of 2.024. The real earnings 
management residual as the abnormal proxy ranges from 37.207 to 0.772 with the average of -2.885 and standard deviation of 3.152. 
The observation data of real earnings management is also quite distributed as seen from the standard deviation values that are higher 
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from the average value. The proportion value of independent commissioner in the sample companies at the observed years ranges 
from 0.000 to 1 (negative proxy). The zero value shows that there was no independent commissioner during observation. The average 
is -0.38522 with a standard deviation of 0.145. Another moderator variable was the audit committee. Based on the companies 
financial report, it was unknown how many audit committees were from external or internal, thus, this research the total audit 
committees. The total numbers of audit committees ranged from 3 to 5 (negative proxy) with the average was 3.05 and a standard 
deviation of 0.253. 
Table 2: Multicollinearity Test Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
FD .877 1.140 .017 58.825 .006 176.697 
REM .877 1.140 .067 14.874 .002 592.218 
KI   .009 108.16   
KI_FD   .005 192.61   
KI_REM   .036 27.783   
KA     .245 4.079 
KA_FD     .006 173.516 
KA_REM     .002 578.942 
 
Table 3:  Multiple Linear Regression Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. t    Sig Coef. t sig Coef. t sig 
Konstanta .310 222.221 .000 .224 41.211 .000 .086 .877 .381 
FD .009 22.506 .000 -.011 -12.595 .000 -.367 -9.952 .000 
REM .003 12.298 .000 .007 8.746 .000 .221 4.278 .000 
KI    -.218 -15.827 .000    
KI_FD    -.048 -20.779 .000    
KI_REM    .007 3.094 .000    
KA       -.074 -2.723 .007 
KA_FD       -.125 -10.479 .000 
KA_REM       .073 4.238 .000 
F-Value  485,378 .000  1265.7 .000  64.378 .000 
Adj. R2  .820   .967   .599  
 
Table 3 shows that the test result of Hypothesis 1 Model 1, which obtained a positive financial distress variable coefficient of 0.009 
with the probability of 0.000<0.05. It means that financial distress variable positively influences the tax aggressiveness. Higher 
financial distress equals to higher tax aggressiveness. Thus, H1 was accepted. Model 2 used moderation variables of independent 
commissioners and interaction of financial distress on tax aggressiveness. The financial distress variable in Model 2 shows a negative 
coefficient value of -0.011 with a significant number of 0.00 < 0.05, meaning that financial distress had a significant negative 
influence on tax aggressiveness. This result did not follow the theory. Based on the VIF tolerance value, the model is not free from 
multicollinearity. In Model 3, financial distress variable had a negative relation on tax aggressiveness with the negative coefficient 
value of -0.367 and a significant number of 0.00 < 0.05, which means financial distress significantly influence tax aggressiveness. 
However, the tolerance and VIF values showed that this variable was not free from multicollinearity. 
The test results of Hypothesis 2 Model 1 showed a positive coefficient value of real earnings management variable of 0.003 with a 
probability value of 0.00<0.05. It means that real earnings management variable positively influences tax aggressiveness. Higher 
total earnings management means higher tax aggressiveness. Thus, H2 was accepted. The real earnings management in model 2 
showed the positive coefficient value of 0.007 with a significant number of 0.00<0.05 (confidence level 95%), meaning real earnings 
management had a positive correlation with tax aggressiveness. In model 3, real earnings management variable obtained a positive 
coefficient of 0.221 with a significant number of 0.00 < 0.05 (confidence level 95%), meaning real earnings management had a 
positive correlation with tax aggressiveness. 
Test results of the hypothesis (H3, H4, H5 dan H6) in Model 2 and Model 3, due to interaction between moderation variable and 
independent variable in the equation as stated by statistic experts, experienced serious multicollinearity between independent 
variables. Thus, to ensure the results, the residual analysis was performed by regressing independent variables on moderating variable 
for interaction with significant influences and show negative direction: KI_FD and KA_FD. Next, the dependent variable was 
regressed on residual absolute value. If t-test shows negative (-) and significant, then it means the moderating variable has a role. The 
results are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4:  Residual Analysis of Moderation Variables 
 Independent Commissioner Moderation (KI) Audit Committee Moderation (KA) 
 KI_FD  KA_FD  
t-count -1.720*  .475  
Sig. 0.070  0.635  
(*) significant confidence level 90% 
In Model 2, the moderation variable of the proportion of independent commissioners on financial distress had a significant influence 
on tax aggressiveness. However, because the model did not free of multicollinearity, there needed a residual analysis, as shown in 
Table 4. It was known that t-count was negative (-) and significant; thus, it could be concluded that the proportion moderation of 
total independent commissioners on financial distress negatively influenced the tax aggressiveness and followed the hypothesis. 
Therefore, H3 was accepted. 
In Model 3, based on Table 3, it was known that the total audit committee as the moderation variable on financial distress did not 
influence the tax aggressiveness. 
Furthermore, the moderation of the proportion of independent commissioners on real earnings management also had a significant 
effect on tax aggressiveness, but the positive coefficient (+) did not follow the theory even though the significance level is 0.000<0.05. 
Thus H5 was rejected. 
Next, the moderation of the total audit committees on real earnings management had a significant effect on tax aggressiveness; 
however, the coefficient is positive and did not follow theory. So it could be concluded that the audit committee did not moderate 
real earnings management. Thus, H6 was rejected. 
As a note, based on Model 2 and Model 3, the independent commissioners variable and the audit committee, separately (not as a 
moderating variable) turned out to have a significant negative effect on tax aggressiveness. 
Conclusions  
The results showed that when the company experienced financial distress, management usually looked for a quick fund source with 
unforeseen risks. The easiest fund to obtain was the tax payment fund. Meanwhile, using fund from debt would add interest expense 
and a rejection possibility from creditors. Another cause was that audit from tax apparatus was conducted after the end of the tax 
year, thus, impossible to detect early, unless it led to tax evasion or tax penalties. Real earnings management that was performed 
through abnormal operating cash flow, operating production cost, and abnormal discretionary expense, influenced tax aggressiveness 
behaviour empirically. Next, based on the results, it was known that the regulations made by regulators in good corporate governance 
related to the existence of independent commissioners and audit committees (which one of its members must come from independent 
commissioners) independently and not as moderation variable in a go public company affected tax aggressiveness in the company. 
A useful corporate governance application that was proxied by the board of independent commissioners and audit committees could 
be an adequate supervision and controlling mechanism to prevent managers' opportunistic actions in managing companies to not to 
break the established rules and provisions and to avoid, even reduce, tax aggressiveness actions by the companies. This research is 
not free from limitations or shortcomings that need to be refined and followed up by further studies. Researchers still difficult to find 
the component of Researce and Development (R&D) costs to measure abnormal discretionary costs in real earnings management. 
Discretionary costs in the financial statements of the companies that are the sample of observations, there are no specific details in 
the financial statements, so the researcher only includes total sales costs and total administrative and general costs as a measure of 
discretionary costs. Comprehensive research is needed, to assess the reasonableness of the proportion of discretionary costs to total 
sales costs plus general and administrative costs. 
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